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Letter from the Editor 
Mission Statement 
International law, perhaps more so than the law in any other field, operates on the level 
of the personal. In essence, intematinallaw is really nothing more than another form of 
diplomacy; albeit one which serves one of humanity's higher aspirations - that of coming to 
common agreeable terms under which we all can live and prosper. The substance of interna-
tional law represents the fruits of the world community's gradual and sometimes hesitant 
attempts to exploit and develop those areas of common agreement which might possibly serve 
as a foundation for establishing a more complete regime of mutual cooperation and effective 
dispute resolution. International law is therefore simply a chronicle of the world community's 
piecemeal efforts to craft what might be termed the common law of nations .. 
With this in mind, we here at International Dimensions wish to welcome you to what 
we hope will prove to be a useful addition to the larger body of legal commentary; what we 
have in mind is a journal dedicated to exploring and examining the law as it actually plays out 
in practice, as described by those actively engaged in practicing it. In this respect, this is 
intended to be as much a journal of personal impression and experience as it is one of legal 
scholarship. After all, unless we are firmly grounded in knowing where we are and where we're 
corning from, how can we possibly have any idea of where we're going, even if we do know 
where we ultimately want to be? 
Our hope, then, is that we have identified a field worth exploring and an approach 
worth taking. Whether we have or not will depend on your response. We hope you enjoy 
reading this, and find something of value in it. 
Sincerely, 
Brian Grantham 
Chief Executive Editor 
Fa111996 
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Investing in France: 
A Survey of French Corporate Formalities 
by Erin Doherty Sarret 
Attorney 
Law Offices of Hanna, Brophy, McAleer, MacLean & jensen, 
San Francisco, California 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the foreign investor, French corporate law can be 3. Do you wish your business venture to be known to the 
confusing due to its complexity. Beyond this first impression is the public? 
reality ofthe French Government actively encouraging investment 4. To what extent is limited liability a concern for you? 
in France. The corporate formalities allow the foreign investor a 
panoply of methods in which to conduct business in France. 
This paper is designed to give a first-time investor an 
overview of the possible avenues of investments. 
However, no action should be taken without first 
consulting counsel, preferably local counsel with a 
strong international practice. 
Of special interest is the DA TAR, an 
agency designed to assist foreign investor by 
subsiding their investments in France subject to 
certain requirements. The DA TAR also works 
with the investor to help facilitate the overall 
investment process. Additionally, due to 
legislative changes in 1988 regarding direct 
investment, the foreign investor has been 
exempted from Treasury review if the 
investment is less that 5,000,000 French 
francs (equivalent to approximately one 
million dollars at the time of publication of 
this paper). 
ll. DECIDING ON A CORPORATE 
FORM 
To determine which corporate form is right for your 
business, you should first ask yourself the following questions: 
I. How much control do you wish to retain? 
2. Do you want your business in France to be privately or 
publicly held? 
5. How much do you want to invest? 
Answering these initial questions will help put you on the 
right track to investing in France and deciding which of the business 
forms discussed below will work best for your interests. 
III. CORPORATE FORMS 
A. The Liaison Office 
In this status, the foreign business 
continues to operate as a foreign-owned company 
subject to foreign-laws. However, it is necessary 
to obtain the carte de commerr;:ant to conduct 
business if the foreign investor is not an EEC 
national or does not possess the carte de resident 
The tax status of the liaison office will 
be sheltered from French income taxes where 
it is properly designated and not considered a 
permanent establishment. The OECD Model 
Tax Treaty Article 5(3) allows this 
exemption. I 
B. The French Branch Office 
If one decides to make a direct investment 
and open a branch office, extensive filing 
requirements apply. The law of the foreign 
jurisdiction where the parent company 
was organized will apply but a branch manager must be appointed 
to have apparent authority to act on behalf of the parent company.2 
The strict labor laws in France have prompted numerous 
collective bargaining agreements for almost every conceivable 
profession. Even lawyers are subject to a collective bargaining 
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agreement of which they may 
not opt out. Additionally, 
these same labor laws are 
fiercely protective of the 
worker and at-will 
employment is virtually 
unknown. Instead, as a branch 
office, the company will be 
subject to French labor laws 
as the contract for hire and the 
work to be performed takes 
place in France. 
Additionally, the 
accounting must be kept in 
French francs to meet the tax 
compliance regulations and 
the parent company's records 
may be subject to review based 
on the business activities in 
France. It is for this reason 
that the foreign investor must 
be aware of the tax liabilities 
and Securite Sociale 
regulations regarding their 







companies wherein the 
investors do not wish to make 
their activities part of the 
public record can fulfill their 
invesUnent goals through the 
corporate form of a societe en 
participation.3 By not 
registering the business 
activity as a true corporate 
form however, the participants 
are not covered by the limited 
liability provisions of the 
corporate form and their 
business concern has no legal 
personality. The law 
governing partnerships also 
governs this type of business 
activity. Taxes are also 
assessed as a general 
partnership. 
D. Societe en Nom 
Collectif : General 
Partnership 
Like its American 
counterpart, the SNC is not 
subject to corporate tax rates. 
Instead, the taxes are passed 
through to the general 
partners A 
The SNC differs 
from the SP in that the SNC 
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has a full legal personality and is 
subject to all of the registration 
regulations of French corporate 
law. In this manner, the partnership 
is substantially different from the 
flexible American model. 
Disadvantages of the SNC 
include the following: Decisions 
must be made only with unanimous 
approval of all partners, no limit on 
liability and a business permit 
would still be required for non-
residents. 
Limited partnerships are 
known as societe en commandite 
simple or SCS which resemble the 
American format of a partnership 
consisting of both general and 
limited partners. The SCS has the 
advantage of being able to elect to 
make the entire income of the SCS 
subject to corporate tax wherein 
the general partners are taxed as if 
their status was that of a limited 
partner. 
E. Societe en Commandite par 
Actions: Stock Partnership 
This hybrid corporate 
form has the management rules of 
the SA with the stock regulations 
of the SCS. Owners are either 
general partners or solely 
shareholders who wish to be passive 
investors only. 
Taxation of the SCA is 
akin to the SA and not the SNC 
which is a major difference between 
the SCA and the SCS. A 
distinguishing feature of the SCA 
is that its stock can be freely traded 
on the stock exchange. 
F. Societe Anonyme • 
General Corporation 
The business form most 
akin to our general corporation is 
the socciete anonyme. The basic 
requirements for an "SA" are a 
minimum of seven shareholders 
and paid-in capital of 250,000 
French francs prior to registration. 
The paid-in capital must be in a 
blocked account but half of the 
total requirement can be paid in at 
the time of registration with the 
addi tiona! half paid in over the next 
five years . 
The corporate by-laws 
and articles of incorporation must 
be drafted and filed before the 
corporate entity is approved. 
Again, if the investment is over 
5,000,000 French francs, 
Treasury approval must be given 
before the corporate form is 
approved. Fortunately, once the 
complete filing is made, Treasury 
approval is deemed granted if no 
response is heard within thirty 
days of the filing. 
A major difference 
exists between French and 
American corporate laws 
regarding the life of the 
corporation: in the U.S., a 
corporation is of infinite 
duration. In France, the life of 
the corporation is 99 years, which 
can be renewed.5 
As in the U.S., French 
law governs the corporation by 
statute. 6 However, choice of 
forum is negotiable. 
G. Societe Anonyme-a 
Responsabilite Limite -
Limited Liability Corporation 
The SARL is used for 
smaller, usually family-held, 
companies. These businesses 
need the corporate formalities 
and their protections but do not 
possess the capital to start up an 
SA. The SARL requires 50,000 
French francs as If one person is 
forming the SARL, it is known 
as an EURL (enterprise 
unipersonnelle a responsabilite 
limite). Both the SARL and the 
EURL are subject to a 4.8% 
registration tax, even if 
incorporated outside of France. 
The SARL is also 
limited to a duration of99 years. 
The SARL is similarly required 
to draft by-laws and articles of 
incorporation. The stock of the 
SARL may not be publicly traded 
nor sold to third parties. 
H. Societe par Actions 
Simplifiees 
The newest type of 
corporate form became effective 
on January 3, 1994 under a series 
of reform legislation known as 
"les lois Madelin" after 
congressman Madelin, more 
recently Minister of the Treasury, 
and now back to being a 
over the traditional SA and 
SARL form since its inception. 
Its requires only two 
shareholders and paid-in capital 
of 250,000 French francs. The 
two shareholders may both be 
corporations or companies, even 
if not listed on the French Stock 
Exchange or "Bourse" and the 
shares of the SAS are privately 
held. 
What the SAS has 
accomplished is a way to ensure 
the protections of the corporate 
laws but without the massive 
registration requirements and 
other demanding regulations of 
the SA and SARL. 
I. GIE: Economic 
Interest Grouping 
The groupement 
d' interet economique, or GIE, is 
a specialized corporate form with 
very flexible rules and 
regulations. The GIE has full 
legal personality and is 
comprised of owners known as 
"members". The purpose of the 
GIE is an 
extension of the economic 
activities of the members but in 
reality, is not limited to these 
activities. 
The members of the 
GIE are jointly and severally 
liable. Taxes are assessed on the 
same basis as a general 
partnership with flow-through 
deductions for losses by the 
members. The members are 
subject to corporate taxation to 
the extent that any profit is 
realized on a pro rata basis. 
The articles of 
incorporation must be filed with 
the clerk of the commercial court 
but not stated capital is necessary. 
The GIE is subject to the strict 
anti-trust laws of both France 
and the EEC which may be quite 
strict in light of the members' 
ideas regarding the direction of 
the business goals of the GIE. 
TheEEIG,orEuropean 
GIE is another corporate form 
thatissimilartotheFrenchmodel 
but allowed at the EEC level if at 
congressman. least two of the members are 
The "SAS" has been from different EEC countries. 
used with increasingly regularity However, the EEIG is subject to 
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much stricter regulations 
regarding the nature and extent 
of its business activities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hopefully, the reader 
has gained insight as to the 
variety of corporate forms 
available in France. Again, one 
is cautioned to proceed with the 
assistance of counsel to avoid 
problems that can arise in 
addition to the potential conflicts 
due to the language and customs 
of France with which one may 
not be familiar. Depending on 
the individual needs of the 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
investor, there is a corporate 
entity that will allows the foreign 
investor to proceed with their 
business goals. The recent 
relaxation of the regulations 
regarding investment and 
obtaining Treasury approval in 
addition to the assistance of the 
DAT AR make France a more than 
viable option for foreign business 
investment. 
I France: A Legal and Tax Guide, 
Francis Lefebvre, Paris, 1992. 
2 ld. 
3 Civil Code, Art. 1871 (Dalloz, 
1995-96) 
4 Civil Code, Art. 1871-1 
(Dalloz, 1995-6) 
5 Civil Code, Art. 1838 (Dalloz 
,1995-96) 
6 Civil Code, Art. 1837 (Dalloz, 
1995-6) 
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How High Is the Sky -
Views from an Aerospace Plane 
Introduction 
In 1957, Sputnik-1 was placed in 
orbit above the Earth, followed by Laika, 
Yuri Gagarin, and finally Neil Armstrong's 
televised walk upon the moon in 1969. At 
present, man has the capacity to live and 
work in outer-space for extended periods. 
At the time of this writing, Russian and 
American cosmonauts are living together 
on the Russian space station Mir thousands 
of miles above the surface of the Earth. 
Eventually space stations may be the bases 
from which manned flights of space objects 
will be sent to Mars and beyond. However, 
despite scientific progress, most likely 
beyond the imagination of the sixteenth 
century mind, the more mundane task of 
discerning where the line between "air" 
and "space" lies continues to be elusive and 
amorphous, rendering any demarcation 
inherently arbitrary. 
In the near future, man will have 
the capability to access outer space through 
the use of hybrid aircraft/space objects 
(hereinafter: aerospace planes)I equally 
adept at maneuvering within the atmosphere 
as without it.2 These vehicles will require 
a set legal framework capable of atten9ing 
to the diverse issues which will invariably 
arise tnerefrom.l The aerospace plane will 
unquestionably alter the future of 
transportation. It will 1) allow vehicular 
transportation of people and/or cargo to the 
opposite side of the Earth within two to 
four hours, and 2) bring people and/or 
cargo into the low orbit of the Earth, much 
like the Space Shuttle (except at a fraction 
of the cost). Thus, two purposes will be 
accomplished with this single new 
development. However, this multiple-
tasking raises questions as to what law 
should be applied. In this respect the 
by 
Kyle C. Frazier 
aerospace plane is a legal chameleon. 
It is this aerospace plane problem 
which this paper will attempt to address. 
Namely, whether a boundary between 
airspace and outer space (vertical horizon) 
should be adopted, and if so, where it should 
lie in light of the modem technological 
advancements, with the aim of suggesting 
the proper legal regime to pertain. Section I 
will briefly examine the significance of the 
demarcation issue, air law and space law, the 
distinctions between the two, and the 
ramifications of their respective differences. 
Section II will provide a cursory discussion 
of the many theories proposed to delimit the 
boundary between airspace and outer space. 
Section ill will examine plausible approaches 
to the establishment of legal regimes and 
their applications to the aerospace planes of 
the future, with a special emphasis on 
Christol's "purpose and effects" approach. 
Section IV will contain an assessment of the 
beliefs as to the appropriate method of 
applying existing law to aerospace planes. 
I. An Examination of Air Law 
and Space Law 
Although we know where airspace 
is and also where lies outer space, there 
exists a margin, or band, within which the 
exact location of the demarcation must lie if 
one is to be found at all . However, given the 
slow transition from airspace to outer space, 
it will be necessary in the near future to fix a 
boundary (vertical frontier) to facilitate space 
exploration and exploitation without 
uncertainty concerning the legal regime to 
be applied. This will be particularly germane 
when aerospace planes operate to provide 
both transportation between two points on 
the Earth and also to provide orbital access 
to cargo and/or personnel. 
Due to the rapid development of 
scientific and technological capabilities, two 
independent branches of international law 
have originated- air law and space law- the 
former stemming from advances subsequent 
to the initial foray into the air by the Wright 
brothers, the latter largely a product of the 
space race between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States. 
Regulation and application of these two very 
different regimes is provided by international 
law, largely through international 
agreements. However, none of these defines 
the altitude of the upper limit of airspace (or 
as the Soviet Union characterized the matter, 
the "upper boundary of state territory"), nor 
the lowest limit of outer space, the latter 
being open to the use by mankind without 
restrictions and ramifications attendant upon 
territorial sovereignty acknowledged in air 
law. 
Two issues arise from this set of 
circumstances. First, is there any necessity 
to delimit the border between airspace and 
outer space?4 Many nations, including the 
United States,s take the position there is no 
need to define where outer space begins 
since in the history of space exploration 
there has been no instance where one nation 
has complained that another has violated its 
territorial airspace during launch or landing. 6 
Indeed, Manfred Lachs and others have 
contended that space objects, upon re-entry, 
frequently enter the air space of other states 
without drawing protest from the subjacent 
sovereigns, despite failing to inform such 
nations of the impending overflight.7 This 
has occurred for nearly forty years. Thus, it 
can be persuasively argued that this natural 
necessity of space navigation has become an 
unwritten rule of law derived from 
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international agreements and usages, if not 
indeed customary international space law. 
On a teleological level, when the 
Outer Space Treaty declared that outer space 
should be free for States in its use and 
exploration in the interests of all mankind, it 
could be argued that the right to overflight 
was bestowed upon space faring nations. Bid 
For this purpose space has largely been 
considered a res communis, although there 
has been no attempt to create an international 
institution to enforce international control.9 
Indeed res nullius seems appropriate since it 
is used to denote an area capable of 
occupation and susceptible to ownership 
without necessarily ascribing any notion of 
national sovereignty, however, unfettered 
freedom is not necessarily attached to this 
latter designation.•o 
Another argument rests on the 
notion that any definition would be arbitrary 
since science cannot define exactly where 
outer space begins.ll In a related vein, it 
could be stated that since satellites in 
geostationary orbits often have perigees 
much lower than their apogees, they could 
cross the border somewhere between perigee 
and apogee, thus exposing them to separate 
legal regimes on a daily basis.•2 Also, it can 
be debated that the process of negotiating an 
explicit agreement would lead nations to 
make immoderate and unacceptable demands 
on their claims to sovereignty. Lastly, 
detractors ofthe creation of a vertical horizon 
argue that the definition is of little practical 
importance since the minimum operational 
height of satellites is much higher than those 
of airplanes, limiting any likelihood that 
there will arise a situation where the 
delimitation issue will arise. But, as 
mentioned earlier, the development of the 
hybrid craft will soon contravene this 
rationale, which seemingly seeks to 
perpetuate the status quo. 
On the other hand, although there 
is no unanimity of opinion among writers as 
to the proper relation of air law and space 
law and whether any definition of a vertical 
frontier is necessary, many nations and 
scholars assert that a definition is required 
because 1) it will be necessary for the future 
application of international law as science 
and technology continues to develop, 2) the 
lack of definition of outer space invites 
nations to test the sovereignty of other states 
which could create international unrest, and 
3) a clear definition would allow nations to 
solidify domestic law concerning defense 
and exercise of sovereignty abiding by and 
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incorporating the accepted international 
definition. Building upon a notion enunciated 
by Manfred Lachs, which stated that there is 
a necessity for a clear definition and boundary 
since space law has evolved through the 
verbum legum of treaties which were formed 
and expressly designed for the regulation of 
outer space. As a consequence, a separate 
area of law has been formally created. It is 
apparent that the law controlling the 
aerospace plane requires formalities to clarify 
the application of law should a situation 
requiring an appropriate aerospace plane 
legal regime arise in the future.ll It is believed 
that it would be appropriate to anticipate a 
problem arising. Furthermore, rather than 
deal with the aftermath of the problem, it 
would be beneficial and constructive to 
assemble the legal framework in advance of 
its necessity. 
A. The Significance of the 
Delimitation Between Air and Space 
In 1966 the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space was instructed to begin "studying 
questions regarding a definition of the 
concept of outer space and the use of outer 
space and celestial bodies."l4 To this date, 
despite significant progress in the lex 
specialis of space law, there has been no 
formal findings on the part of the commission. 
Although the demarcation question may 
appear academic at the present juncture, the 
import of the boundary between airspace 
and outer space is based on three very relevant 
and timely considerations, the last of which 
provides the focus of the present paper. 
First, state sovereignty entails 
"complete and exclusive authority" over all 
airspace (atmospheric airspace) above its 
territory.IS In a 1951 address, Prof. J.C. 
Cooper, a founder of the Institute of 
International Air Law asked, "How far 
upward in space does the territory of the 
state extend?"l6 Indeed, it is incontestable 
logic that at some point sovereignty ceases. 
An example of the type of sovereignty 
problems likely to occur in the future, without 
a formalized vertical horizon, is the 
December Declaration of 1976. In this 
instance eight equatorial states claimed 
territorial sovereignty over geostationary 
orbits located twenty seven thousand miles 
above the Earth's surface. Geostationary 
orbits are in limited supply and as such, are 
a valuable resource offering unique economic 
benefits.l7 The claims were rejected as the 
orbit was recognized as outer space, thus 
free and clear of imputations of state 
sovereignty.IB As will be discussed in 
further detail infra, customary international 
space law recognizes an altitude equal to 
that of the lowest orbiting space object to be 
the boundary between air and space. This 
designation, as will be discussed infra has its 
limitations where the hybrid craft is 
concerned. However, as a matter of 
sovereignty, it has been and will continue to 
be, a perfectly reasonable and utilitarian 
method to limit state sovereignty. This 
subject is worthy of an in-depth analysis, 
howev~r, for the purposes of the present 
paper; -a close study of the problem will be 
sacrificed for a more detailed examination 
of the hybrid craft problem. 
The second consideration involves 
issues arising from events occurring at the 
present margin between airspace and outer 
space, and the necessity to decide which 
regime would pertain- air law or space law .19 
As with the issue of sovereignty, this topic 
merits in-depth discussion. However, given 
space considerations, only a brief outline of 
one of the most important of the ramifications 
will be examined, that relating to variances 
regarding liability under air law and space 
law. 
In this regard, the consequences of 
the application of air law as opposed to space 
law is significant. In air law, under the Rome 
Convention of 1952,20 and its amendments 
completed in 1978, persons injured on the 
ground may recover damages, upon proof 
that the injury was caused by a craft in flight 
(or persons or objects falling therefrom).21 
Not only must the injured party prove fault, 
but the compensation granted by the Rome 
Convention is limited. In contrast, under the 
Liability Convention, which governs liability 
for damage caused by space objects on the 
surface of the Earth, the launching state22 is 
strictly liable and must provide restitutio ad 
integrum.23 
Regarding collisions with aircraft 
in the air, although extremely rare, air law 
would apply fault-based liability, while space 
law would hold the launching state absolutely 
liable.24 In respect to damage to goods, 
cargo, or passengers, under air law the 
Warsaw Conventionls applies, while under 
space law the Liability Convention continues 
to apply. Under the Warsaw Convention, 
the air carrier (not the state) is liable for 
damages arising from injury in the form of 
loss of life or physical injury and damage to 
goods and cargo.26 However, the air carrier 
will not be found liable if all necessary 
measures were taken to avoid injury, or if the 
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injury was caused due to the 
negligence of the injured party .21 
Under space law, liability would 
attach to the launching state for 
damages to passengers, cargo, 
or baggage, unless due to the 
negligence of the injured party .2s 
Fault must be proven under the 
Warsaw Convention, which may 
be very difficult to prove. Thus, 
there are very significant 
differences relating to recovery 
of damages for injuries suffered, 
depending on the legal regime is 
applied. 
The consideration 
which imports significance to 
the delimitation issue in the 
present paper revolves around 
the rapid development of the 
modem aerospace plane, which 
presents a unique and novel 
question- which law should 
apply to such a vehicle (and 
indeed whether differing regimes 
should be used upon exit and re-
entry into the atmospheric 
airspace). On May 14 and 15, 
1991, an international 
colloquium was organized by 
the French Society for Air and 
Space Law. The purpose of the 
colloquium was to create 
awareness of the legal problems 
which may arise when hybrid 
spaceplanes become a reality, 
and also to propose solutions. 
Indeed, the importance of the 
regime to be applied to the 
aerospace plane will have an 
effect on foreign policy, science, 
and economics (both in the 
government and the private 
sectors). Also, a predetermined 
regime will provide stability to 
the field, avoiding potentially 
detrimental confusion. Also, the 
designation of the applicable 
regime will have an effect on 
liability and possibly also on 
sovereignty. 
B. Air Law and Space 
Law 
Space law is distinct 
and separate from air law, much 
like maritime law is independent 
of and separate from air law.29 
Implicit in any discussion of air 
law versus space law is the 
assumption of a pre-existing 
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dividing line. The Outer Space 
Treaty alone refers to "outer 
space" 37 times, yet nowhere 
defines the use of the term, nor 
suggests a likely method of 
discerning an acceptable altitude 
at which it may lie. There are 
several important differences 
between air law and space law 
which must be examined to 
provide a focal point for further 
discussion on the import and 
implications involved in 
determining where a line of 
delimitation should be drawn as 
to a vertical horizon, if any. 
Therefore it will be beneficial to 
examine the different regimes, 
their basic applications, and the 
ways in which they differ. 
l.Air Law 
While in a traditional 
common law view, a state's 
control over its airspace was 
considered to extend to the end 
of the universe,30 this boundless 
sovereignty (including "effective 
control" as a salient 
characteristic) was restricted 
somewhat by the 1919 Paris 
Convention, which was 
prompted by increased use of 
aircraft during WWI, 
necessitating the advent of a rule 
of international law regulating 
international flights . The Paris 
Convention resolved to establish 
each state's exclusive control 
over its "superadjacentairspace." 
In 1944, The Chicago 
Convention further extended the 
Paris Convention. 
The Chicago 
Convention, defines an aircraft 
as .••any machine tht can deive 
support in the atmosphere from 
the reactions of the air." The 
Chicago Convention also 
inspired the creation of the 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO}, a 
specialized agency of the United 
Nations, to provide cohesion and 
cooperation between nations in 
the area of civil aviation. Today, 
millions of passengers are 
handled, and about four hundred 
jumbo jets fly over three million 
miles every day.3• Under air 
Ia w, bilateral air service 
agreements provide 
authorization for international 
flights, thus transit is restricted 
in the absence of these 
agreements. Also, registration 
of aircrafts need only be carried 
out in the nation of origin (flag 
state), and there are standards of 
safety which must be observed.32 
Thus, the Chicago Convention, 
bilateral air service agreements, 
and the various conceded 
"freedoms," all combine to 
provide the framework within 
which international travel and 
transport operates. 
2. Space Law 
Space law consists 
primarily in the five major 
treaties and public international 
law since states are the primary 
actors.33 As pointed out by Prof. 
Diederiks-Verschoor, there is an 
analogy between space law and 
the Antarctica Convention of 
1959, which waived national 
needs and claims to sovereignty 
in the interests of freedom of 
use, although Antarctica has 
clearly defined boundaries.34 
The primary 
underlying premise of space law 
is freedom of use.3S Although, it 
should be noted that private 
entrepreneurship may soon 
engage in endeavors involving 
the exploration and exploitation 
of outer space. The cornerstone 
of space law, the Outer Space 
Treaty, is not universal] y lauded. 
Harry Almond, Professor of 
International Law at theN ational 
Defense University in 
Washington, D.C., has deemed 
the treaty "insufficient in scope, 
ineffective for control, and 
unavailing for implementation 
and enforcement of 
regulations."36 The Outer Space 
Treaty provides that all activities 
in outer space must be conducted 
in accordance with international 
law, including the Charter of the 
United Nations, with the 
intention of maintaining 
international peace and security 
and promoting international 
cooperation and understanding. 37 
This treaty also prescribes that 
all nations, on the basis of 
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equality and without 
discrimination, are free to 
explore and use outer space, 
characterizing outer space as the 
province of all mankind.3B Also, 
states are to refrain from 
appropriation of space and 
celestial bodies,39 and to register 
with the U.N. information 
regarding the launch of space 
vehicles.4o Also, liability 
attaches regardless of fault if the 
injury occurs to an aircraft in 
flight or on the surface of the 
earth, while fault liability applies 
if the injury occurs in outer 
space.41 In general, States bear 
responsibility for their activities 
in space.42 It must also be noted 
that there are no safety standards 
or licensing bodies to clear flight 
and establish flight requirements 
for objects launched into outer 
space. 
C. The Differences 
Between Air Law and Space 
Law 
As mentioned 
previously, the primary 
distinguishing factor between air 
law and space law is that the 
former is based on sovereignty 
and the latter is based of freedom 
of use. The following will briefly 
outline these differences. First, 
as promulgated under air law in 
the Paris Convention and further 
reinforced in the Chicago 
Convention,eachsta~eisgranted 
complete and exclusive control 
over the airspace above its 
territory along with effective 
control. The opposite is true of 
space law where freedom of use 
prevails. But there are also 
several other important aspects 
of air law that need to be 
discussed in connection with the 
differences between it and space 
law. In air law, there are 
registration and authorization 
requirements for overflight, a 
recognized freedom to fly over 
high seas, and other flight 
worthiness requirements. In 
space law none of these exist. 
The Chicago Convention applies 
to ci vii aircraft engaged in 
international flights, while space 
law is concerned with the 
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activities, rights, and liabilities 
of states. A carriage by air is 
considered "international" if its 
place of departure and 
destination are in different 
countries or if the carriage begins 
and ends at the same place or in 
the same country, but makes a 
stopover in a foreign country.43 
According to space law, there is 
no distinction to be made 
between international and 
domestic activities. 
Air law also utilizes 
separate national registries,44 
while international space law 
requires that each state register 
each object launched into orbit 
in a national registry and also 
supply information to the 
Secretary General of the United 
Nations.45 Under space law the 
space object must be re-
registered each time it is launched 
into outer space, whereas 
airplanes need only be registered 
upon their first use under air law. 
It is furthermore worth noting, 
that nations need only provide 
such information to the Secretary 
General as they deem necessary 
under space law. 
Air law focuses on 
navigation and commerce,46 and 
places restrictions on the ability 
to utilize territorial airspace.47 
Under air law the first two 
"freedoms" refer to overflight 
and transit rights. These 
freedoms include the freedom to 
fly over the flag state's territory 
non-stop or for a non-traffic 
purpose (refueling for example), 
and are governed primarily by 
bilateral air service agreements. 48 
However, no nation has ever 
protested the passage of a space 
object over its territory (as 
discussed supra). Although this 
may not constitute a customary 
rule of international space law, it 
is a significant departure from 
air law. Another difference 
between the two regimes 
concerns the "commercial 
freedoms" of air law for an 
aircraft to carry cargo, baggage, 
and passengers from or to the 
flag state. Under space law these 
"freedoms" are covered by 
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launch contracts between the 
parties involved in the launch, 
and there is at present no 
established customary 
international space law on this 
topic. Finally, air navigation is 
subjectto air traffic control, while 
the aircraft itself is under the 
complete control of the captain, 
who, as representative of the flag 
state, has complete jurisdiction 
on board the craft. Space objects, 
on the other hand, remain under 
the direct control of the flight 
director on the ground.49 It is as 
yet unclear what role astronauts 
play and the status they are 
granted.so Indeed they are 
envoys of mankind, but the 
question whether they are to be 
considered passengers is an 
important question that must be 
addressed. 
There is also a broad 
consideration under space law 
which is overlooked in air law. 
Due to the primarily private and 
civilian nature of international 
agreements concerning air law, 
no express provision in the 
regime focuses on disarmament 
and/or arms control as in space 
law. Indeed, there are separate 
restrictions regarding military 
aircraft, which are beyond the 
purview of the present article. 51 
As cursorily discussed in the 
preceding section, there are 
significant differences between 
air law and space law which 
would have an effect, not only 
on the administration and 
operation of the aerospace 
planes, but also upon the liability 
attaching to the responsible party. 
II. Whereabouts of 
the Demarcation 
As evidenced by the 
preceding, the problem of 
delimitation has been the subject 
of disagreement for decades.s2 
In light of the seeming necessity 
for a definition of outer space,s3 
this definition could be based on 
scientific (geophysical) 
considerations, technological 
considerations, or operational 
considerations. Indeed, many 
scholars note that the 
"indivisibility principle" 
supports the notion that air and 
outer space are merely different 
degrees of one another. Thus, 
any definition would be 
contrived. However, a decision 
making process that incorporates 
social, cultural, economic, 
historical, and political needs 
would be no more arbitrary than 
any other conceptual definition 
and should be explored. The 
following section will discuss 
various alternative methods for 
defining outer space and attempt 
to briefly outline the arguments, 
in favor of and opposed to, each 
respective method. 
Customary 
international space law54 fixes 
the boundary of space at the 
lowest possible position that 
space objects can safely orbit 
above the Earth's surface.ss This 
is also known as the "Satellite 
Operation Theory", initially 
suggested in 1958.56 Presently, 
this places the boundary at 
approximately 100 to 110 
kilometers. However, the 
altitude of the boundary is subject 
to change and will continually 
decrease as technological 
advances allow for orbits with 
lower perigees. As a result, 
customary international space 
law currently follows, and will 
continue to follow, the evolution 
of technology. The problem with 
this is that it does not provide a 
stable and predictable legal 
environment, which, given the 
large investments of time, 
money, and research necessary 
for the development of space 
resources, seems preferable to a 
constantly shifting line 
demarcating the altitude at which 
international space law is 
applied. Therefore, unless a 
treaty agreement is concluded, 
setting the boundary at the 
present altitude, or one at a 
similarly reasonable altitude, the 
integrity of this approach will 
remain in question due to its 
inherent instability. 
The "Airspace Theory" 
posits that the altitude to which 
the atmosphere extends should 
be considered as the boundary of 
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outer space. This position finds 
its impetus in the language of the 
major air law agreements, 
including the Convention on the 
Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 
the Spanish-American 
Convention on Aerial 
Navigation, the Convention on 
Commercial Aviation, the Paris 
Convention, and the Chicago 
Convention, all of which 
explicitly refer to their respective 
applicability regarding 
sovereignty over "airspace" 
above a states' territory.s7 The 
expression "airspace" is 
understood here, in its usual 
sense, to mean the region above 
the Earth's surface where air 
exists.ss However, the problem 
with this theory is that the air 
service agreements were signed 
before the advent of space flight. 
Given this lack of cognizance of 
future application and the effects 
of temporal and technological 
disjunction, the use of this 
terminology as a basis for a 
modern definition of airspace is 
inappropriate and of limited 
merit. Indeed, at 80 kilometers 
air density is one-millionth of 
what it is at sea level. This can 
hardly be considered air space. 
There is not enough air to support 
winged flight. Minute traces of 
atmospheric components have 
been detected as far out as 400 
kilometers, and may technically 
be considered still within the 
confines of air space. This theory 
seems an improbable and 
unworkable approach. 
The "Aerodynamics 
Theory" suggests that the 
delimitation should exist where 
air density is such that it cannot 
produce the aerodynamic 
reactions necessary for aircraft 
flight.S9 However, this theory 
places outer space in the 
stratosphere at approximately 30 
kilometers, which is far below 
the operational level of space 
objects. Also, aerodynamic 
reactions to air are a function of 
speed. Thus, as technology 
advances, the altitude at which 
airplanes can operate will rise, 
thereby constantly altering the 
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definition of outer space. This 
approach faces the same 
problems as discussed under the 
international customary space 
law/satellite operation theory .60 
The "LimitofEffective 
Control Theory" says that space 
should be determined by 
extending the altitude of airspace 
as far as a state can effectively 
enforce its sovereignty.6I It is 
also suggested, under this theory. 
that a second zone would exist 
for self-defense up to 
approximately 480 kilometers, 
which would be called 
"contingent space", and would 
allow for a right of passage for 
non-military vehicles. Above 
this contingent spac:e. all space 
vehicles would have the 
complete freedom granted to 
legal uses in the present system 
of international space law. 
However, this theory (which was 
proposed by the advanced 
spacefaring nations early in the 
history of space exploration and 
exploitation) has been largely 
abandoned as a potential method 
for delimiting the boundary of 
space, since developing nations 
would remain at a clear and 
unacceptable disadvantage 
compared to nations with space 
capabilities.62 Furthermore, it 
would produce multiple 
boundaries, varying according 
to the technological 
advancements of the subjacent 
states. 
A variety of other 
theories have been suggested 
from the "van Karman line," 
where "lift" need not be the only 
support, while the line would be 
drawn up to the point where any 
aerodynamic lift is available,63 
to the height at which the 
atmosphere will no longer sustain 
human life.64 However, these 
theories also suffer from flaws 
associated with the inherent 
inability of science to adequately 
determine a natural boundary 
line. 
An altogether different 
alternative, which is one of the 
most interesting suggestions, 
was espoused by Cooper, who 
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suggests an attempt to merge the 
two areas of law into one 
cohesive area of law called 
"aerospace law". This idea is 
based on the fact that both areas 
oflaw have respective strengths 
which are applicable to man-
made flight. The definition of 
aerospace as propounded by 
Cooper is: "the earth's envelope 
of air and the space above it, the 
two considered as a single realm 
for activity in the flight of air 
vehicles and in the launching, 
guidance and control of ballistic 
missiles, earth satellites, dirigible 
space vehicles and the like."65 
However, the construction of an 
entirely new legal regime would 
likely create more problems than 
it would solve, assuming 
agreement could be achieved as 
to the components to be 
integrated from air law and space 
law. 
In light of scientific and 
technological advancements, it 
may eventually be the case that 
the maximum altitude of 
airplanes will overlap with the 
minimum altitude of power 
assisted satellites. In this 
scenario, typical air activities 
could be conducted at altitudes 
higher than some typical space 
activities.66 Thus, it seems 
necessary that some border be 
established, if for no other 
purpose, than to clarify matters 
which are likely to arise in the 
future.67 
m. The Application of 
Law to the Aerospace Plane 
A. The Spatial 
Apt) roach 
A spatial approach to 
the application of law to the 
aerospace plane would utilize a 
physical boundary, as discussed 
in the previous pages, between 
air space and outer space to 
determine the legal regime 
controlling the hybrid vehicle. 
This boundary, of course, would 
impute space law if the vehicle is 
above the line, and air law if 
below the line which encircles 
the Earth. This approach 
examines both the physical 
relation of the craft to the earth 
and the physical environment 
where the craft is located. 
Pursuant to the classifications 
enunciated by Christo),6S these 
are "objective" considerations. 
Among other objective 
considerations to be examined 
are the crafts abilities to maintain 
itself for an extended time in an 
environment lacking in large 
degree from the physical 
elements associated with 
atmosphere. Indeed, according 
to the definitions of a space 
vehicle as set forth in the 
Registration Agreement and 
Liability Convention, these 
considerations would qualify 
such a vehicle as a space object. 69 
As Haanappel has suggested, 
such a vehicle must be capable 
of operating long enough to 
survive more than a brief 
encounter with "near space".7o 
It is Christo!' s belief that there is 
no rational basis for favoring 
one boundary approach over 
another, since the identification 
of which would not account for 
the purpose for which a craft is 
sent up.71 Christo! further 
believes that the advent of the 
aerospace plane requires an 
approach that takes all objective 
and subjective considerations 
into account, without relying on 
arbitrary lines drawn a hundred 




approach, asserts that since the 
aerospace planes will be engaged 
in identifiable activities, these 
activities should determine 
which legal regime would 
apply. n Adherents to this theory 
argue that, due to the inherent 
difficulties surrounding the 
establishment of a viable 
geophysical or technological 
approach to the delimitation 
problem, a distinction should be 
made as to whether the activities 
are aeronautical or 
astronautical. 73 Thus, if an object 
is performing activities of an 
astronautical nature, it would be 
governed by space law, 
regardless of its altitude. The 
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implication of this theory is tha 
there is no necessity for a boundary 
between air and space, because 
they can be considered as part of 
each other, taking into accoun 
the gradual transition which isl 
known to exist as the atmosphere 
cedes to space.74 I 
The arguments in 
support of this theory are varied.? 
First, it is pointed out that space 
law covers movement through 
outer space, thus implicating any 
transit that encounters oute 
space.76 However, this argumen 
is a tautology since without anyl 
definition of where space begins, 
there can be no value to thel 
statement. Also suggested as a 
rationale bolstering the 
functionalist approach is based 
on the language of the major air 
agreements mentioned earlier77 asl 
taken in their usual sense-
"airspace" meaning the area above 
the Earth where air is present. As 
discussed earlier, this sort ofliteral 
interpretation of language 
implemented before cognizance 
of future space travel is of little 
value as a rationale for any 
assertion as to the validity of a 
potential theory of demarcation,, 
be it a spatial or a functional 
approach. 
Other notions claimed to 
support the functional approach 
include: 1) the fact that in the area 
between the highest altitude 
modern aircraft can fly and 
satellites can currently orbit there 
is a "mesospace" where no specific1 
law should pertain; 2) the notion 
that so long as spacecraft has an 
objective in outer space that does 
not violate any space treaties and 
the safety of subjacent nations is 
secure, there is no reason to 
establish a specific boundary 
between air and space; 3) the 
notion that the Space Treaty, 
which itself does not define outer 
space, is a functionalist treaty due 
to its very nature. However, as to 
this latter notion concerning the 
space treaty, it is believed tha 
reasoning to mirror that of the 
questionable application of word! 
discussed under the "airspacf 
theorty" which precede( 
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technological advancements, 
rendering any interpretation of 
those terms in the present day 
inappropriate and uninfluential. 
Indeed, whatever merits or 
drawbacks which may underlie 
any of the above rationals for the 
functionalist approach, they 
together certainly convey the 




As evidenced by the 
various and competing theories 
discussed, thre is much 
disagreement as to the method 
through which it should be 
determined which legal regime 
is to apply when aerospace planes 
become a technological and legal 
reality. Christol has suggested a 
potential legal regime which 
seems eminently logical and 
adaptable, and thus may provide, 
if not a solution to the problem, 
a greater understanding of the 
question and a general indication 
of where a solution may lie. The 
following section will briefly 
outline Christol's approach and 
identify its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Christol' s thesis is 
based on the premise that there 
are two areas which should be 
focused upon: 1) the intended 
purpose of the vehicle, or 2) the 
effects of the vehicles activities. 
Pursuant to this, Christo! believes 
that the capabilities of the craft, 
both subjective and objective, 
should be considered. Thus, if a 
vehicle's purpose or effect is to 
act as "an aircraft it should 
conform to the regime of air law." 
The same reasoning would also 
apply if the vehicles "purpose or 
intent" was that of a space craft. 
Under this theory, there is no 
need for a formal boundary 
between air and space as the 
application oflaw would depend 
upon the characterization of the 
crafts "purposes or effects", not 
upon a formal boundary. 
Christol feels a new 
option must be developed for 
ascertainment of the appropriate 
regime of law since the spatial 
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and functional approaches are 
both incapable of properly 
confronting the legal 
ramifications of an aerospace 
plane operable in both air and 
space. As Christo! explains, both 
the spatial and functional theories 
account for "objective" 
considerations, but fail to 
consider how the craft is to be 
used or its effective uses (the so-
called "subjective" factors) . 
Given the basis for the 
development of these aerospace 
planes- the movement from place 
to place over the surface of the 
Earth (an air activity), to 
accomplish certain tasks in orbit 
(a space activity)- it seems 
appropriate to apply the law 
which most closely comports 
withtheobjectiveofthemission. 
Thus, under this theory, if a 
craft's announced purpose was 
to transport cargo between two 
points on Earth while briefly 
finding itself above the point 
where customary international 
space law delimits the boundary 
of air and space, the craft would 
continue to be ruled by air law. 
Likewise, if a craft with the 
announced purpose of engaging 
in space activities should travel 
through airspace it would be 
treated under space law. This 
framework, Christo! argues, 
would "facilitate an expanded 
use of the hybrid vehicle." 
Christo! further argues 
that even though the criteria of 
ascertaining which law would 
apply is subjective on the part of 
the state engaging in hybrid 
flights, there is no danger of 
misconduct on the part of these 
nations due to the built in and 
imp I icit elements of his 
approach. Regarding the 
announcement of the purpose, 
he states that since a purpose can 
be announced and implied from 
conduct, there is no danger of 
misdesignation of purpose used 
to the advantage of the state 
launching the aerospace plane. 
This is supported further, in 
Christol's view, by the fact that 
the Registration Agreement 
would apply to space activities, 
and the fact that the place of 
departure and pattern of transit 
would be "difficult to conceal." 
Thus, based upon the reasoning 
of Christo!, all problems 
concerning spatial and functional 
approaches are avoided, and the 
law to be applied can simply be 
determined through the 
announced or declared purpose 
or the de facto intent as implied 
by the actions of the state 
employing the hybrid vehicle. 
Christol further points out that, 
"most importantly", 
international and air and space 
law would still pertain. Indeed, 
Christol' s approach is very 
persuasive and eminently logical. 
By focusing not on the vertical 
horizon or the actual operational 
capacity of the craft, and instead 
basing the application of law 
upon the designated purpose of 
the craft, there would be no 
confusion as to the applicable 
law. 
IV .Conclusion 
There exists a wide 
variety of thought concerning 
the topic of legal regimes and 
their applicability to the 
aerospace plane . Indeed, 
spatialists suggest that a 
demarcation, in the form of a 
vertical horizon between air and 
space, would best serve to 
regulate the aerospace plane. The 
most persuasive argument 
behind this approach is based on 
the fact that given the large 
number of international 
agreements which purport to 
apply to "airspace" or "outer 
space" respectively, there is a 
necessity to establish when these 
agreements lose or acquire 
efficacy. This can only be 
established by the demarcation 
of a vertical horizon. Indeed, as 
discussed earlier, there are also 
several other important 
ramifications attendant upon the 
delimitation of a line between 
airspace and outer space such as 
sovereignty and the application 
of law to aerospace plane 




approach, on the other hand, has 
a very appealing simplicity . If 
an aerospace plane is engaging 
in the activities of an airplane, it 
should be governed by air law, 
but while engaged in the 
activities of a space object, it 
should be governed by space law. 
As logical as this appears, the 
functional approach fails to 
clarify the altitude at which 
airspace gives way to outer space, 
thus perpetuating the vagueness 
of the major air and outer space 
agreements mentioned earlier. If 
the functional approach were 
adopted in conjunction with an 
international agreement which 
established the altitude of the 
vertical horizon, however, this 
approach would be acceptable. 
Nonetheless, for all the simplicity 
and logic of the functionalist 
approach, it is believed that there 
exists a preferable alternative 
approach. 
Regarding the 
aerospace plane, it seems 
Christol' s approach, which lacks 
several of the drawbacks of the 
spatial and functional 
approaches, is the most plausible 
solution to the advent of the 
aerospace plane. Christo I' s 
approach would apply the regime 
that applies to the mission's 
stated purpose. Although nations 
may be tempted to designate a 
mission as an air mission when 
in fact the hybrid craft is truly 
engaged in space activities, in an 
effort to avoid absolute liability 
which is applied under the 
Liability Convention, the danger 
of this is limited by the simple 
fact that it would be apparent 
from the activities of the craft, 
whatactivitiesitwasconducting. 
However, Christol 
overlooks (as do the 
functionalists) the possibility that 
a future aerospace plane may be 
capable of engaging in a mission 
with both an air activity and a 
space activity. In this situation, 
trouble would arise determining 
which law would supersede the 
other, or if both regimes should 
concurrently or successively 
apply. It is suggested that both 
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Declaration of Human Rights 
when it prohibited the county 
from not considering medical 
care and clothing costs when it 
sought to reduce the amount of 
the minimum subsistence for 
housing and food costs under 
general assistance.37 And in 
Lipscomb v. Simmons,38 a three 
judge federal panel invalidated 
an Oregon statute that denied 
state funds to foster children 
living with relatives. The court 
supported its decision with 
various references to the 1948 
Universal Declaration ofHuman 
Rights, the Civil and Political 
Covenant and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, even though 
the United States is not even a 
signatory to the last 
convention.39 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court, by 
declining to treat the children as 
a suspect class, and finding the 
Oregon statute was rationally 
related to a legitimate state 
interest.40 
As these examples illustrate, 
international human rights law, 
as an interpretation mechanism 
can be used as a defense when 
the state prosecutes those living 
where they are forced or chose to 
live in violation of an ordinance 
to not sleep in particular areas.41 
Because of the obstacle created 
by self-execution requirements, 
the interpretive application is one 
way the defense can mount an 
argument to increase the stakes 
for an arrest and prosecution by 
the local authorities and change 
the overall bargaining leverage 
in the criminal processes. 
Ultimately, what rights 
really exist is a moral question as 
well as structural legal issue. 
What a society values, and the 
method of enforcing those rights 
is subject to political viewpoints 
and the will of its people. For 
example, what are the 
implications under the right to 
be treated with dignity in a state 
that does not make assisted 
suicide illegal ?42 If that state is 
a signatory to the Civil and 
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Political Rights Covenant, and 
interprets the international 
obligation of right to privacy to 
be consistent with domestic non-
criminal status, will that domestic 
application be allowed as an 
interpretive aid in United States 
courts as an defense to criminal 
prosecution for violation of 
assisted suicide laws? What if 
the defendant was from another 
state where ignorance of the law 
is a recognized defense and 
assisted suicide is a matter of 
human dignity and criminal 
wrongdoing? What if a 
defendant from a foreign state 
visiting the United States assists 
in a suicide and faces prosecution 
under statute or common 
law?Would an international 
interpretive application of these 
factors provide a defense? These 
are some of the issues that will 
arise as international law 
becomes a more influential norm 
in domestic law. Or stated in the 
form of a question: Will 
international norms become 
influential in the application of 
legal adversarialism? 
Whether an 
international instrument is or is 
not a source oflaw under United 
States law may not be the 
ultimate issue. As the above cases 
illustrate, the Courts in their 
wisdom, for better or worse, are 
recognizing the power of 
international law as an 
interpretive aid to determine the 
validity of laws. Where the law 
is gang in this regard is not 
certain, but it is not unclear. As 
the world becomes a more 
proximate in time, space and 
communication, the international 
dimension of international norms 
will have a more local influence. 
That influence is not limited to 
political rights or the rights of 
the homeless. It reaches into 
business practices and affairs; 
environmental and territorial 
jurisdiction. It wraps itself in 
comparative practice as well as 
conflicts of law application. 
There are thousands of 
international treaties and 
declarations of which the United 
States is a party. How those 
treaties and customary 
international law play at the local 
level is a matter of creative 
application by practitioners. The 
cost of invoking international 
norms may be minimal, and the 
potential rewards may well 
outweigh any risk. This note, as 
a pedagogical tool, suggests one 
such example of international 
law to local application. 
0 See, eg .. Pottinger v. City of 
Miami,810F.Supp.l551,1559-
60 (S.D. Fla. 1992) where 
homeless sleeping in parks in 
violation of City of Miami Code 
§§ 38-3, 37-34 and Fla. Statutes 
§81 0 .08 trespassing, were 
arrested and permanently 
deprived of possessions under 
threat of prosecution. 
I See, e.g., M. Janus, An 
Introduction to International 
Law 2 (Little, Brown & Co. 
1993). For purposes of this note, 
references to "state" means 
"nation", and reference to 
"municipal" refers to law that is 
domestic to the United States, 
whether it be federal or state 
law. 
2 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 
155/. See also, The Case ofS.S. 
Lotus(Fr. v. Turk.),l927P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No.9, where Turkey's 
enactment of state law 
criminalizing affects to its 
citizens originating outside 
jurisdiction led to a dispute with 
France overpower to enact laws 
that resulted in prosecution 
within the territory for 
extraterritorial acts. 
3 In part, the distraction is due to 
the exclusive powers of Congress 
and the President to have the say 
in foreign relations with other 
nations. U.S. Const. arts. I§ 8, II 
§ 2, VI; Missouri v. Holland, 
252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
4 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 
l976)[hereafter Civil and 
Political Rights]; International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976)[hereafter 
ECOSOC] . 
5 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 884 (2nd Cir. 
1980). 
6 L. Adler, SOS for SSJ: The 
Unfulfilled Promise to Homeless 
Americans, I Geo.J.onFighting 
Poverty 304,316 n. l (1994). 
7 /d. 
8 See S. Landesman, 
Commentary: Tuberculosis in 
New York City-The 
Consequences and Lessons of a 
Failure, 83 Am.J of Public 
Health 766 (1993); see also, K. 
Brudney & J. Dobkin, Resurgent 
Tuberculosis in New York City: 
HJV, Homelessness and the 
DeclineofTB Control Programs, 
144 Am. Rev Respiratory 
Disorders 745 (1991). 
9 /d. 
10 See, e.g., 810F. Supp. 1551, 
1554-5 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
11 See Civil and Political Rights, 
arts. 6, 7, 9, 12; ECOSOC, arts. 
1, 11; see also Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A.Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810, at 71 (1948), arts. 1, 3, 
12, 13, 25. 
12 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. The 
Supremacy clause provides: 
"This Constitution, and the laws 
of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made under the 
Authority of the United States, 
shall be the Supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of Any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." 
13 The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also 
Diggs V. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 
466(D.C.Cir. l972,certdenied, 
411 u.s. 931 (1973). 
14 175 U.S. at 700, where such 
works are "resorted to by judicial 
tribunals, not for what . . . the law 
ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really 
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is ." 
15 The Court decides if a treaty 
is to be self-executing, and ifthe 
plain ordinary language the treaty 
is precise, clear and definite that 
no other implementing act is 
required to make it enforceable, 
it will be self-executing and is to 
be interpreted in a liberal spirit 
as to give construction to a treaty 
even where a local law is 
inconsistent. Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 204 ( 1962); see Foster 
v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet. 253, 
314 (1829); see alsoAsakura v. 
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); but 
cf Sei Fujii v. State of California, 
38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952) . Once a 
convention or treaty has been 
signed and ratified, there is a 
presumption that Congress or the 
state will not act in derogation of 
its international obligation under 
the treaty, unless there is 
subsequent congressional action 
that is clear to displace the prior 
treaty. Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 ( 1804 ); see also 
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 
102, 120 (1932). The court can 
only enforce the treaty to the 
extent it is self executing or there 
is implementing legislation 
adopted as to be enforceable 
against the United States. 
16 See 175 U.S. at 700. 
17 See, e.g., Filartiga at 884-85. 
"While the ultimate scope of 
those rights will be subject for 
continuing refinement and 
elaboration, we hold now that 
the right to be free from torture is 
now among them." ; see also 
Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, pt. VI (1987), 
102(2). 
18 /d. at§ 102(3) 
19 630 F.2d at 884. At one time 
torture was considered a routine 
concomitant of criminal 
interrogation in many nations, 
yet in more modern times it has 
been universally renounced. 
20 U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56. 
21 There is a practical distinction 
between the rights emerging 
from these two covenants which 
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was primarily due to political 
accommodations based on 
distinct regional and hemispheric 
"values". In the theoretical 
context of indivisibility, both 
covenants have been described 
by scholars as different sides of 
the same coin, meaning that 
without one set of rights, the 
other is meaningless . See e.g. 
Marks, Emerging Human Rights: 
ANewGenerationforthe 1980's, 
33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435, 451-2 
( 1981 ). However, each is 
recognized to the extent it has 
been incorporated into the Jaw 
of the particular state. See, eg., 
175 U.S. at 700. 
22 ECOSOC, arts. 2, 11. 
23 Art. 25 of the 1948 U ni versa) 
Declaration of Human Rights 
provides: "Everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of 
himself and family ... including 
housing .. . [for] lack of 
circumstances beyond his 
control." 
24 M. Bowman & D. Harris, 
Multilateral Treaties 304 
(Butterworths II th ed., 1992 
(Supp. 1995)). 
25 Art. 6; see also Bowman & 
Harris at 223 (Supp.) . 
26 Art. 12 specifically provides 
that everyone lawfully within the 
territory of a state shall have the 
right to liberty and freedom to 
choose his residence. 
27 /d. 
28 Bowman and Harris, supra 
note 24, at 233 (Supp .). 
Moreover, no implementing 
legislation has been adopted to 
make articles, as 11 and 17, 
effective in domestic Jaw. 
29 See note 16, supra page 5. 
30 See note 14, supra page 5. A 
state is bound to obligations of 
the treaty to the extent the treaty 
is ratified and self-executing. 
31 See, e.g., Fujii v. State of 
California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722-
23 (1952). 
32 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 
810F. Supp. 1551,1571-80. 
33 /d. at 1584. For example, 
sleeping on a park bench. 
34 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1987). 
35 Jd. at 830-1, n. 34. 
36 Boehm v. Superior Ct., 223 
Cal. Rptr. 716 (Ct.App. 1986). 
37 Jd. at 721. 
38 Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 
F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989). 
39 Jd. at 1244, n. 1. 
40 Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992). 
41 See Pottinger, 810 F.Supp. at 
1584. 
42 See Civil and Political 
covenant. Art. 7 provides that no 
one shall be subjected to 
degrading treatment or medical 
experimentation without 
permission. Art. 17 provides no 
one is to be subjectto interference 
with their privacy by the state. 
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